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A NEW DEATH ACT
Milford J. Meyer*
The subject of actions for wrongful death has been always thoroughly
Lomplicated. 1 Appendages of minor importance have been added to the
century old statutes of Pennsylvania 2 but modernization or codification has not
been attempted. During all this time hundreds of judicial decisions have woven
a clear pattern upon the bare outlines of the acts, bending and moulding uncertain terms to meet unusual factual situations, always founded upon the obscure maxim, "actio personalis moritur cum persona," except insofar as the
statutes in question modified the rule. Today this rule is no more, and with
its paising this intricate and elaborate child of logic and precedent may also be
discarded.
On its face merely an innocuous and obviously necessary reenactment of
the previously declared unconstitutional Section 35 (b) of the Fiduciaries Act,
*L.L.B.. Dickinson School of Law, 1927. Member of Pennsylvania Bar. Co-Editor, Dunlap's
Book of Forms; Collection Practice in Pennsylvania. Author of various legal articles.
lAt common law no action could be brought; Tiffany, "Death by Wrongful Act"; Hay,
"Death as a Civil Cause of Action," 7 Har. L. R. 170; Winfield, "Death as Affecting Liability
for Tort," 29 Col. L. R. 239; Salmond on Torts, page 364; Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) sec. 210.
For a somewhat interesting analysis of the rule see "Recommendations and Study Made in
Relation to the Survival of Causes of Action for Personal Injury" by the Law Revision Commission
of the State of New York, Legislative Document (1935) No. 60 (E), hereafter cited as N. Y.
Law Com.
Pro.,ably the earliest statute modifying this rule of law in personal injury cases was the
Massachusetts Act of 1648, Colonial Laws, Reprint of 1660 Ed., page 126, although there is evidence of departures from the rule in ancient times: cf. Colisem Motor Co. v. Hester (Wyo.)
3 Pac. (2d) 105. The famous English statute of 9 and 10 Vict., ch. 93, called the "Fatal Accidents Act" but popularly known as "Lord Campbell's Act," upon which most of the death acts
are based, was not passed until 1846. An apt criticism will be found in Van Amburg v.
Vicksburg, etc., Co., 37 La. Ann. 650: "Legislation and jurisprudence have combined to perpetuate
the extraordinary doctrine that the life of a free man cannot be made the subject of valuation,
and undsr the domination of that dogmatic utterance, made earlier than the Roman Digest, reproduced therein, and echoed by the courts of all countries from then till now, the singular
spectacle has been witnessed of courts sanctioning damages for shortlived pains and refusing
them for long-life sorrow and the pecuniary losses consequent upon the death of one from whom
was derived support, comfort and even the necessary stays of life."
2Th, Pennsylvania statutes are: 1851, P. L. 669, secs. 18, 19; 1855, P. L. 309; 1911, P. L.
678; 1927, P. L. 992 (12 P. S. Ann. 1601-1604). The amendment of 1937, P. L. 196 (12 P. S.
Ann. 1602) is considered infra. For an outline of the essential features of the statutes and decisions, which it is not our purpose to review, see 2 U. of Pitt. L. R. 167.
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the Act of 1937, P. L. 2755 (20 P. S. Ann. 772) may be far reaching and
perhaps even revolutionary in its effect upon this field. The Legislature, by
failing to correlate this enactment to existing law, has raised complex problems
which may not be solved adequately for some time. It is our purpose to consider these problems and suggest their solutions.
This act reads precisely as did the Act of 1917:3
"Executors or administrators shall have power, either alone or
jointly with other plaintiffs, to commence and prosecute all actions
for mesne profits or for trespass to real property, and all personal
actions which the decedent whom they represent might have commenced, except actions for slander and libel' .... "
Obviously the first question to be determined is whether it encroaches at
all upon the field of personal injury cases. But in answering this query we need
go no further than the very decision which declared the prior enactment uncon-

stitutional. In Strain v. Kern4 our Supreme Court said: 5
"Considering this section alone, without reference to the title of
the act, it would be exceedingly difficult to reach any other con-

clusion than that contended for by appellant, for the present is a
.personal action', not for slander or libel, and, by the language
quoted, 'executors or administrators shall have power to commence
and prosecute . . . . (it, if) the decedent whom they represent,
might have commenced and prosecuted it, as unquestionably
plaintiff's decedent might have done. It is not necessary to decide
this point, however . ..."
The reenactment, in amending the title of the Fiduciaries Act, 6 specifically
nieets the constitutional objection and we well might assume that the "exceeditgly difficult" task of arguing the act out of application to cases of this character will not be overcome now by our courts. This assumption, however, may
be weakened considerably when it is noted that the learned judge of the court
below in Strain v. Kern never had presented to him nor considered the consti3P. L. 447, sec. 35 (b).
4277 Pa. 209. Suit was brought by an administrator as a result of negligence resulting in
his decedent's death. The latter left no widow, children nor parents.
Cf. Staggers v. Dunn-Mar 0. & G. Co., 312 Pa. 269, 272: ".... if there was negligence,
the injured had a common law right of action against the tort-feasor. When he died without
bringing suit, his right died with him."
5At page 211. Compare the similar situation which confronted the courts of Tennessee i.
the case of Ry. Co. v. Lilly, 90 Tenn. 563, 566, where it was held: "The very comprehensive
language 'the right of action . . . . shall not abate or be extinguished,' standing by itself, would
undoubtedly embrace every case of wrongful death." The language of our act is even broader.
6So as to include "the survival of causes ol action and suits thereupon by or against
fiduciaries."

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

tittional question.1 His decision that the act did not apply was reached by a
dcvicus argument which begged the primary question involved. It held that
since the decedent could not have sued for his own death, no right was conferred upon his representative since the act
"deals only with the survival of such actions as the injured man
could have brought. And clearly this could not include an action
based upon his death." s
it is apparent that this logic is inexorable if the suit of the representative
were brougbt for the death of his decedent. But it is not. The "personal
action which the decedent whom (he) represents might have commenced" is an
action for personal injuries based upon the tort committed against him by the
dcfendant.9 If he actually had begun suit in his lifetime, no question possibly
.ould arise as to the iight of his representative to be substituted for him therein
after his death, even though such death resulted from the injuries inflicted.10
The 18th section of the Act of 185111 provided for the survival of actions, that
is suits actually begun by the injured party during his lifetime, but made no
provision for the survival of the rijht of action or cause of action for or upon
which suit had not been begun when death occurred.
On the contrary the instant act is not confined to the survival of actions.
It vests in the representative power to "commence and prosecute . . . . all
personal actions . . . .which the decedent . . . .might have commenced;" and
tCf. 2 Dist. & Co 539, opinion by Finletter, J. A careful examination of the briefs filed
in the Supreme Court fails to disclose any discussion of or argument for or against the con.
stitutionality of the act. The only reference to the title of the act there made is in the appellee's
brief in 'upport of his position that the Legislature did not intend to revolutionize the existing
law applicable to death actions.
SThe faulty logic of this decision follows the earlier case of Hill v.. Penna. R. R., 178 Pa.
223, 228, which considered the respective effects of sections 18 and 19 of the Act of 1851, supra.
The cou,:t said: "While it is very true that the injured party could in no circumstances recover
damages for his own death, yet it is equally true that the cause of action provided for by both
sections
is death resulting from injuries."
9
"It is idle to say that when a man is killed by unlawful, violence it is not an injury to
the person." Moe v. Smiley, 125 Pa. 136, 141.
101n Birch v. Railway, 165, Pa. 339, 344, it was argued (and the court below had decided)
that the death act applied to all cases where the death resulted from the injuries and that a
suit begun by the decedent would survive only in cases where the death resulted from other
causes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in such case the executor was properly sub-

stituted. Cf. Lutge v. Rosin, 32 D. & C. 338, 344. The opposite conclusion was reached in
Kansas: lendrix v. Wyandotte County, 245 Pac. 1052.
n1Rights of action, and actions already begun, for personal injury where death does not
result therefrom would survive in any event under a general survival act; they would in no wise
partake o:F
the nature of death actions. Prior to the act of 1937 even such rights of action would
not have survived if suit had not been begun during the lifetime of the injured person: Cf.
Penna. R. R. v. McCloskey, 23 Pa. 526, 529. Cf. prior Act of 1834, P. L. 73, sec. 28 and later
Act of 1895, P. L. 236.
Itis interesting to note that in Crider v. Moorhead, 51 Pa. Super. 532, it was contended that
even though suit had been brought in the lifetime, the action would not survive if the death
did not result from the negligence charged, the converse of the Birch case. The contention was
again overruled.
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that the action for personal injuries is of such nature is the burden of Strain -v.
Kern.
In considering the effect of this enactment upon existing law it may be
well to bear in mind, first, that it is remedial in nature:
"The legislation under consideration is remedial and should be
construed liberally so as to effect the intended purpose of changing
the former law .... ."12
&condly, that a new rule of statutory construction had been established just
before this act was passed:
"The rule that laws in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed, shall have no application to the laws of this
Commonwealth hereafter enacted."' 8
Before considering its proper place in this field of law let us enumerate
some of the defects of the existing law and the probable effect upon them.
(1) The only parties benefited by the death acts are the surviving spouse,
Lhildren and parents.14 The tort-feasor whose victim is survived by none of
tLese classes enjoys almost complete immunity from the effects of his tortious
act by rea.son of the severity of the injuries inflicted. The survival statute would
destroy this immunity since the suit under it would be brought for the benefit
4 the estpte. 15
(2) Under existing law full immunity might be enjoyed by the tortteasor even in some cases where the designated relatives survived. This would
(cclr when the death of the injured party did not result from the injuries
received but from some other cause. If he had instituted no suit in his lifetime,
ncne could be brought for the death and none for the injuries. Although no
case of this nature has been found, this may well be due to the appreciation of
12Chief Justice Mestrezat in Centofanti v. Penna. R. R., 244 Pa. 255, 263, discussing the
death acts.
is in the
Cf. Chief Justice Cooley upon the similar Michigan statute: "The statute ....
strictest sense a remedial statute and as such it should receive not a strict, but a favorable construction. It was passed to remedy a great defect in the law, whereby, through the very severity
of the injury which a party's negligence or misbehavior had caused, he in many cases escaped
" Merkle v. Bennington, 58 Mich. 156.
responsibility altogether ....
laAct of 1937, P. L. 1019, Art. 4, sec. 58 (46 P. S. Ann. 558).
4
l Except the limited recovery provided by the Act of 1937, P. L. 196 (12 P. S. 1602)
Bause v. Kreiger, 256 Pa. 395; Potter T. & T. Co. v. Petcoff, 122 Pa. Super. 540; Eiffer v.
Anderson, 122 Pa. Super. 547.
Cf. Harper, Law of Torts, sec. 279, pp. 607-608; 13 A. L. R. 225, 236.
IsSee cases cited hereafter; and also Lhota v. Oppenheimer & Co., 247 Pa. 280, 282;
Littman v. Bell Telephone Co., 315 Pa. 370, 378; Manganiello v. Lewis, 122 Pa. Super. 435, 438.
16Birch v. Railway, 165 Pa. 339, 346; Crider v. Moorhead, 51 Pa. Super. 532, 536.
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the Bar that none would lie. 17 The personal representative in such a case now
•.ould be cmpowered to sue for the personal injuries suffered and the damages
ccnsequent thereto.
(3) Actions under the death act frequently may be complicated with
issue; as co prior desertion of a spouse or parent. 18 This issue under a survival
statute would be eliminated from the case and relegated to its proper place,
.he tribunal determining the rights of distribution in the fund raised.
(4) The meagre damage recoverable under the death acts has been
limited by the decided cases to the pecuniary loss suffered by the survivors. 19 A
far greater measure would be imposed under the survival statute since the suit
would be brought not for the death but for the personal injury.20
I[f the instant act is to be given full force and effect, it immediately btcome; apparent that resort will be had to action under the survival statute in
a great majority of cases.
Having determined that the act necessarily impinges upon the field in
question, we next consider the effect to be given this new legislation. A
number of possibilities will suggest themselves. The most obvious probably
is that this enactment should be construed to repeal the death acts in toto, a
17cf. the argument advanced in Lutge v. Rosin, 32 D. & C. 338, 342. Nor is such a
situation within the protection of the Constitutional provision that no act of assembly "shall
limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resA'Iting in death, or for injuries to persons or
property; and, in case of death from such injuries, the right of action shall' survive, and the
general assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such action shall be prosecuted." Constitution

of 1874, Art. 3, sec. 21, as amended November 2, 1915. This provision has been held not to
affect the death acts which precede it: Books v. Danville Boro., 95 Pa. 158.
18Cf. Milyak v. P. R. T., 300 Pa. 457; McFadden v. May, 325 Pa. 145; Kephart v. Penna.
R. R., 16 Dist. 756; Kerr v. Penna. R. R., 169 Pa. 95. See also 23 Ia. L. R. 122.
19Namely, the pecuniary loss to the survivor; compensation for the destruction of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage from the decedent based upon reasonably continuous
past acts or conduct of the deceased: Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, and cases therein cited
in extenso.
20:f. Penna. R. R. v. McCloskey, 23 Pa. 526, 530, decided before the Act of 1855. See
Harper, op. cit. supra, sec. 279, p. 607: "But in a number of states, the so-called 'survival
statutes' cause the right of action which accrued to the injured party to survive his death, as part
of the estate which passes to the personal representative. Such right, of course, is the right
which the decedent had immediately prior to his death to recover compensation for his suffering,
loss of earnings and expenses incurred by reason of his injuries."
A novel situation might frequently arise were this rule not to be followed. Consider the
case of Lutgev. Rosin, 32 D. & C. 338, 342. Here the injured party brought suit in his lifetime and substitution was made after his death. Defendant then sought to join another party
as being solely liable for the cause of action sued upon. The latter's objection that the right
of action of the decedent against him did not survive was overruled in reliance upon the Act of
1937. In this case if the measure of damage suggested did not apply to the surviving cause but
only to that upon which suit had been brought we would have a situation in which two defendants
in a single suit, possibly joint' tort-feasors, might be held responsible for a single tort but
accountable for different measures of damage. The possible question of contribution between them
would be an insoluble one. The Court of Common Pleas, in there considering the question of
the applicable measure of damage, said (p. 348): "There is no indication in the act, nor has
any authority been discovered to the effect, that a different measure of damages is to be applied
in the one type of suit (survival action) than in the other (survived cause of action)."
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convenient solution to the entire problem, which hardly would be considered
seriously by our courts. No express repeal will be found in the act for, we
may say without fear of contradiction, the Legislature never considered the
affect of this law upon the field here discussed. Implied repeal is not to be
favored; 21 a rule which is particularly applicable where at the same session the
Legislature amends the earlier act 22 as it did in the instant case. 2s
A more difficult argument to refute will be that proposing the converse
proposition: that, despite the apparent applicability of this statute to the field
here discussed, our courts should hold now that the right of action of the deceased (in cases where he has not begun suit in his lifetime) already has been
conferred by the death acts and that therefore there remains no necessity nor
reason for the further disposition of this right to the personal representative. 2'
In other words, the argument will be presented on the basis that the "legislative
intention" was not to create a remedy alternative to or cumulative with the
2
death acts. 1
The proponents of this argument first must refine the words of the statute:
r4 1 personal actions," so as to eliminate or exclude the right of action for personal injuries, a refinement which to us appears to be possible only by means
28
of some species of legal legerdemain. The specific language of Strain v. Kern
then must be retracted in toto as dictum. Although it may be well characterized
as such,2 7 its cogent logic hardly can be denied. The second burden of the
proponents' argument is the substantiation of the minor premise that the right
of action continued by the survival statute is the same as that conferred by the
21"Laws in pari materia: shall be construed together, if possible, as one law." Statutory
Construction Act of 1937, P. L. 1019, Art. 4, sec. 62 (46 P. S. Ann. 562) and cases cited therein.
22". ... a later law shall not be construed to repeal an earlier law unless the two laws
be irreconcilable." Ibid, Art. 7, sec. 91, 46 P. S. Anti. 391 and cases cited, particularly Com.
v. Crawl, 52 Pa. Super. 539; Com. v. Pottsville, 246 Pa. 468; Duffy v. Cooke, 239 Pa. 427.
See also sec. 65 of the act.
I2April 1, 1937, P. L. 196 (12 P. S. Ann. 1602) by adding: "If none of the above relatives
are left to survive the decedent, then the personal representative shall be entitled to recover
damages for reasonable hospital, nursing, medical, funeral expenses, and expenses of administration necessitated by reason of injuries causing death." This is also a conclusive answer to the
argument that the sole intention of the Legislature was to permit a recovery inycases where
there are no survivors in the favored classes. Were this true, the cited amendment would have
been sufficient to supply this deficiency.
24This proposition would not be founded upon an argument for a narrow construction of
the act as that considered, supra, was. Rather it would be an argument ad necessitatum based
upon 25the alleged nature of the rights of action treated by the two acts.
See note 48 infra.
"Manifestly, the Legislature had no proper conception of the subject-matter of these two

different schemes of legislation with which they were dealing, and it is no particular ground of
criticism of the Legislature, when the intricacy and difficulties of the subject are considered."
Mobile R. Co. v. Hicks, (Miss.) 46 So. 394, 397.
26Which is quoted, supra.
27
Since the point of the decision is the unconstitutionality of the act by reason of the
defect in the title, it need not have been judicially determined that the act would have ap.
plied to the case. On the contrary, it is irrefutable that if the terms of the act could have been
refined so as not to apply to the case at bar the question of constitutionality need not have been
considered. In fact, the court below placed its decision entirely upon this basis: see note 7 supra.
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death acts. The legal theory that the right of the beneficiaries is "derivative"
must form the basis of this approach.
Astute analysis will be necessary before this term "derivative" is applied
unqualifiedly to the action brought under the death act. This terminology may
be and generally is used in contradistinction to the term "new cause of action"
usually ascribed to the act. In this regard little assistance will be found by
either side in the decided cases;2 8 the two labels being applied in specific situations so as to justify the decision sought to be reached. So it is held consistently
that te act creates a "new cause of action" 29 so as to fix the measure of damage
thereunder as not the value of the life taken but the pecuniary loss suffered by
the named survivors; 3 0 and that contributory negligence of the plaintiff-survivor
constitutes a complete deftnse;35 as does a personal disability of the survivor. 3 2
So also recently it has been held conversely that it is not of such derivative
nature! as to carry with it the personal disabilities arising from the relationship
of the injured party to the defendant.38 On the contrary the right of action
is stated to be "derivative" 3 4 to such extent that a release by the injured party
28cf. St. Louis R. Co. v. Goode. (Oki.) 142 Pac. 1185: "In approaching the matter, the
investigator will be bewildered by the variety of views expressed and the apparently hopeless conflict into which the courts have fallen; but this is more apparent than real. Much of thd
trouble comes from the fact that the statutes involved in the various states differ widely."
See also Brown v. Chicago R. Co., (Wis.) 78 N. W. 771: "No attempt will be made to
harmonize all the conflicting observations found in the decisions elsewhere regarding the nature
of Lord Campbell's Act. That cannot be done, and it is not necessary, for most of the conflicts
will disappear as one applies judicial observations to the particular facts in regard to whicH
they were made."
See cases collected in Cooley, op. cit. supra, sec. 211, notes 88, 89.
29"This act does not transfer this right of action to his representative but gives to his repre'
sentative a totally new right on different principles": Blake v. Midlands Ry. Co., 18 Q. B.. 93,
110. Cf. Tiffany, op. cit.supra., secs.19, 23: Sutherland on Damages, (4th ed.) sec. 1260;
pp. 4852-3; and see Shambach v. M. C. Elec. Co., 232 Pa. 641; Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski'
321 Pa. 438.
3OPenna. R. R. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 335; McCafferty v. R. R. Co., 193 Pa. 339, 346; Birch
v. Railway, 165 Pa. 339.
31Johnson v. Railway, 160 Pa. 349; Pa. Co. v. James, 81 Pa. 194; Shaffer v. Mowery, 265
Pa. 300: Dattola v. Burt Bros., 288 Pa. 134.
The contrary conclusion is reached in New York: McKay v. Syracuse R. T. Ry Co., 101 N.
E. 885; Braun v. Buffalo G. E. Co., 107 N. E. 338.
For cases in other jurisdictions, see 17 Corpus Juris 1185, sec. 38; 23 A. L. R. 6759
17 B. U. L. R. 429; 39 Dick. L. R. 174; 70. U. S. L. R. 502; 18 Ia. L. R. 387; 27 I1. L.
R. 314.
32
Denti v. P. R. R. Co., 181 Pa. 525; Maiorano v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 216 Pa. 402; iri
which cases non-resident aliens were barred from taking advantage of the death acts. Subsequent
legislation
now protects such parties: Act of 1911, P. L. 678.
3S
3 4 ee text, infra, and notes 39, 40.
8 Staggers v. Dunn-Mar 0. & G. Co., 312 Pa. 269;.Centofanti v. P. R. R. Co., 244 Pa.
255; Derr v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 158 Pa. 365.
Resert to this nomenclature is unnecessary under the original Lord Campbell's Act and its
more faithful offspring, since the statute itself specifically provides that the action may be main.
tained only under such circumstances as would support a recovery by the injured party had he
survived. The sole condition attached to the Pennsylvania act is that no suit for damageb shall
have beei brought by the injured person (Birch v. Railway, 165 Pa. 339). The failure to
include the more specific proviso coupled with the desire of our courts to conform to the foreign
decisions probably accounts to a great extent for the confusion ih the uses of these terms.
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totally extinguishes it;"u his contributory negligence constitutes a complete defense;11 the running of the statute of limitations against him bars the survivors;87 and the latters' right of action is subject to other disabilities of the
dcedent.88
85Hill v. Penna. R. R., 178 Pa. 223, 228; suggesting that an action brought by the injured
party would have barred a subsequent action for his death, the court said: "... ..he
had
exercised his control over the right of action at a time when he alone had the whole right, with
the same effect as if he had brought an action and had prosecuted it to judgment and satisfaction." It relies upon an English case upon the same facts which turned upon the wording of
the act not present in our own. These are: "and the act is such as would, if the death had
not ensued have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages." The
Queen's Bench held that since the party injured had settled his claim, the case had been taken
out of the words of the statute: Read v. Great E. Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555. The logic of
the decision is open to serious question since the release could hardly destroy the effect of
the "wrongful act" although it bars the remedy. Cf. note 80 U. of Pa. L. R. 993, 995; Sherlock
v. Ailing, 44 Ind. 184, 187: "That provision is inserted for the purpose of defining the degree
of delinquency with which the party must be chargeable in order to subject him to the action."
See note 37 infra.
An apt and logical criticism of this doctrine will be found in many of the cases. One
which is frequently cited is Rowe v. Richards, 35 S. D. 1: "We must confess our inability to
grasp the logic of any so-called reasoning through which the conclusion is drawn that the husband,
simply because he may live to suffer from a physical injury and thus become vested with a cause
of action for the violation of his own personal right has an implied power to release a cause of
action-one which has not then accrued; one which may never accrue; and one which from its
very nature cannot accrue until his death; and one which if it ever does accrue will accrue in
favor of his wife and be based upon the violation of a right, vested solely in his wife." Cf.
Railway Co. v. VanAlstine, 77 Ohio 395; 6 U. Cin. L. R. 212, and see Pym v. The Great N.
Ry. Co., 4 B. & S. 396, where the Lord Chief Justice Cockburn answered the same argument:
"We were at first struck with this argument, but on consideration we are of the opinion that
the condition that the action could have been maintained by the deceased if death had not ensued
has reference not to the loss or injury sustained but to the circumstances under which the bodily
injury arose, and the nature of the wrongful act, neglect or default complained of." This, however, is the rule supported by the vast weight of authority; cf. Cooley, op. cit. supra, sec. 211,
,note 89a.
86p. R. R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318; P. R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33; Grant v. Phila.
etc. R. Co., 215 Pa. 265; Fink v. Garman, 40 Pa. 95; P. R. R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315;
Dabrinski v. Pa. Co., 248 Pa. 177. This is the generally accepted rule: Tiffany, op. cit. supra,
sec. 66 and cases cited therein, and in Cooley. op. cit. supra, sec. 211, note 96.
87Howard v. Bell Telephone Co., 306 Pa. 518, 523: ".....
while the right of action
given by the statute to the widow is a new one, it is dependent upon the existence of a right
of action in the husband at the time of his death." Accord: Flynn v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R.
Co., 283 U. S. 53, overruling Koons v. P. & R. Ry. Co., 281 Pa. 276.
As to the conflict on this subject, see Notes 80 U. of Pa. L. R. 993, 998; 19 Harv. L. R.
458; 12 B. U. L. R. 741; Sherlock v. Ailing, 44 Ind. 184; Causey v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co.,
166 N. C. 5.
Akin to this problem is the one presented when the injured person dies of the injuries

after the death of the tort-feasor; if the death act created a truly new cause of action, it would
.ot arise until after the death of the tort-feasor and could not be prosecuted against him or his
representatives. Cf. Hegel v. George (Wis.) 259 N. W. 862, and 19 Marq. L. R. 263. The
N. Y. Law Com. (p. 45) poses this problem and reaches the opposite conclusion referring to
testamentary libel cases as analogies and citing 15 Harv., L. R. 483; 23 Yale L. J. 534; and
•16Minn. L. Rev. 93. This rule does not apply to a contractual matter to which the defendant
is not a party, such as an assignment by the deceased of his cause of action after suit is brought,
in which case his administrator is not barred from substitution after his death:, McCafferty v.
R. R. Co., 193 Pa. 339, 346.
38Cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440.
No cases appear to have arisen in Pennsylvania involving contractual disabilities. Only
secently there was raised for the first time the interesting question of the admissibility of decedent's declaration as to fault in an action by the survivors. Relying upon Dennison v. Miner,
17 W. N. C. 561 and Liebster v. Lucas, 82 Pa. Super. 184, both personal injury cases, the Common
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Some further light may be thrown upon this obtuse subject by the fine
distinction drawn by our Supreme Court in the recent case of Kaczorowski v.
Kalkosinski:8s
"We have announced the principle that the statutory action is
derivative because it has as its basis the same tortious act which
would have supported the injured party's own cause of action
... .Its derivation however is from the tortious act and not from
the person of the deceased, so that it comes to the parties named in
the statute free from personal disabilities arising from the relationship of the injured party and tort-feasor."
If this be accepted as a basic axiom it follows that the action under the death
act "derives" directly from the tortious act (i. e. directly inures to the beneficiary) white the action under the survival act "derives" from the person of the
deceased by the very wording of the statute. This being so the latter act does
more than embrace the same field as the death act and must be given its proper
force and effect. Chief Justice Kephart in the last cited case said:'0
"It was intended to create a new right and to compensate for a
loss independent of that suffered by the deceased .

.

.. . Compen-.

sation is being sought therefore for the specific wrong to them
(survivors) . .

.

. this death statute is an attempt to compensate

an independent wrong to the parties named in the statute...."
Hence it has been said that a substituted right of action was given to the
survivors named in the Act of 1855 if no action had been actually begun by the
injured person during his lifetime. 1
Perhaps the clearest characterization of the nature of a death act is that
42
of Professor Harper:
"By Lord Campbell's Act, a new cause of action is created which
is separate and distinct, it is said, from that created by the wrong
ful act of the defendant against the decedent, although it exists
i.
Pleas Court held the declaration admissible: Rudisill v. Cordes, 99 L. 1. No. 44, pp. 1, 5.
Kiviatkowski v. John Lowry, Inc., (N. Y.) 11 N. E. (2d) 563..
a
subBy the great weight of authority a judgment obtained by the injured person will bar
sequer~t action for his death: Tiffany, op. cit. supra, sec. 124; Sutherland, op. cit. supra, 4854
17 Corpus Juris 1185, sec. 38, note 42; Cooley, op. cit. supra, sec. 211, note 91; although this
problem could not have arisen under the peculiar wording of our statute.
31)321 Pa. 438, 440. Accord: Smith, An Argument for a New Application of Lord Carnp,
bell's Act, 7 Am. L. S. R. 533. Contra: Wilson v. Barton, (Tenn.) 283 S. W. 71; Childs v,
Childs, (Tex.) 107 S. W. (2d) 703. For a full consideration of the question, see Notes 104
A. L. R. 1271; 31 Ill.L. R. 796; 11 Temple L...R. 108, 50 Harv. L. R. 131; 85 U. of PaL
L. R. 124; 35 Mich. L. R. 508; 22 Cornell L. ,R.274.
40321 Pa. 441, 442.
42See cases cited infra, note 61; and see note 35, supra.
42"The Law of Tort" (1933) sec. .279, page 606, cf. note 85 U. of. Pa.. L. R. 124.
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only under circumstances necessary to entitle such person to recover t-d he not been killed."
Whatever its limitations and characteristics may be determined to be, the
chameleon-like right of action created or preserved by the death act hardly can
be said to fully exhaust or transmit the derivative rights which might be and are
specifically conferred by a survival statute.
If the two statutes are reconcilable, undoubtedly they should be reconciled
and a system developed whereby the application of each to a particular case may
be free from doubt.
But the only case in which total reconciliation may be possible appears to
be one in which the decedent, having brought no action in his lifetime, leaves
none of the relatives named in the death act. In such case the Survival Statute
might b'esaid to transmit to his personal representative the "action which decedent . . . .might have commenced" and the 1937 amendment to the Death
Act permits an action by the personal representative but limits the damages
recoverable to expenses incurred. 43 Overlooking the distinctly different character of the two actions we might conclude that in such a case the specific
limitation of the death act amendment would supersede.
In every other conceivable set of circumstances the parties apparently will
have a choice of two actions. In many, perhaps most, cases, different parties
will be interested in the two possible suits. This must result not only from the
divergence in parties-plaintiff named in the statutes but also and perhaps more
frequently from the method of distribution to be followed after the fund is
raised. Other and additional persons are potential beneficiaries of a suit under
the Survival Statute.
We are aware that the proceeds of the action under the Death Act are
distributable solely to the persons named in the act4 4 and are not subject to the
claims of creditors. 45 The contrary would, of course, be true under the Survival
Statute; distribution would follow the testament of thL decedent or the provisions of the Intestate Act and the fund would form part of the general assets
of the estate and be subject to the claims of creditors.' 6 Hence in every case
43
4 4 See

note 23, supra.
See acts quoted supra, note 1.
45Except probably in cases covered by the amendment of 1937. It will be noted that the
added sentence giving the right of action for limited damages to the personal representative is
placed after the clause exempting the recovery from debts, supra, note 29. A student commentator in 42 Dick. L. R. 51 reaches the gratutitous conclusion, probably correct, that recovery
ander the amendment would be for the benefit of creditors of the class suggested to the exclusion
of the heirs of the decedent.
46Taylor's Est., 179 Pa. 254, 260; Maher v. P. R. T., 181 Pa. 391. Cf. Books v. Boro of
Danville, 95 Pa. t58, 165; Miller v. P. R. R., 256 Pa. 142 considering the Act of 1851.
"It is orly by making this recovery an assetof the estate and as such subject to the claims
of creditors that the interest of creditors is even partially taken care of. Certainly it is arguable
that creditors have some kind of an 'interest' in the continuance of the debtor's life. Often-

limes the chief factor in the giving of credit is the anticipation of repayment from the prospective
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creditors of the deceased would prefer a suit under the Survival Statute, as
wculd his relatives not named in the Death Act and legatees under his will.
Ort the other hand, the surviving spouse, children or dependent parents of an
insolvent decedent would desire to sue under the Death Act, although if the
decedent's estate were solvent these same persons might change their preference
because of the larger measure of damage under the Survival Statute. Again
thi:s larger measure might not be sufficient inducement for such a choice if other
relatives survived who would share under the intestate laws.
It is apparent, therefore, that conflicting interests would arise in almost
every case. The tort-feasor would, therefore, be subject to two suits based upon
different rights of action and having different measures of damage. Each being
of separate origin and distinct nature' 7 the institution of one hardly could be
deemed an election of remedy except in the unusual case where the sole benefici.aries of the entire estate are the persons entitled to sue under the Death Act.
A court could not be called upon to declare which of the two claims should be
permitted and which enjoined. The conclusion that both should be permitted
at first may be difficult but eventually necessary to accept.48
The New York Law Revision Commission came to this inescapable conclusjion after its careful survey:' 9
"If a tort causes death, ordinarily two interests are invaded. The
first is the interest of the deceased in the security of his person,
an interest which is invaded by causing both pecuniary loss (medical expenses and loss of earnings) and personal suffering, both
mental and physical. If the injured party brought suit while
alive, the recovery would include these various items of damage.
The second interest is that of the deceased's next of kin, an inearnings of the debtor. Especially in the case of personal loans to wage earners, the lender looks
to the debtor's future earning power as the main item of security. The wrongdoer's act
necessarily destroys his expectant 'interest' and real harm has been done the creditor who does
not have other forms of security (including life insurance on the debtor's life.)" N. Y. Law
Com. page 48. note 1. (The creditor's interest is an insurable one in Penna.) See also 15
Harv. L. R. 854.
4?Pollock
on Torts, 60; 4 Ill. L. R. 425.
4
3ln a recent note in 42 Dick. L. R. 41, Judge Reese, without discussing the subject in
detail, reaches an opposite conclusion. He merely says (page 42): "So far as injuries to the
person of the decedent are concerned, it is believed that the intention of the legislature through
this amendment was not to provide an alternative or cumulative remedy to the action for wrongfiul
death when the injuries suffered cause the death of the decedent."
Such a construction, we
believe-, would be diametrically opposed to the language of the act, as we have indicated. Contra:
Judge Oliver in Lutge v. Rosin, 32 D. & C. 338, 347: "It is possible, and indeed it seems
eviden:, that the legislature intended to provide for two causes of action to be brought in certain
situations by the personal representative ..
"
."T.'he language of that section is so comprehensive and its meaning so apparent that it would
seem to need no construction.
"It is not the province of a court to say that the Legislature did' not mean what the
languag~e employed clearly indicates .... " Melzner v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., (Mont.) 126 Pac. 116,
150. And see Mahoning Val. R. Co. v. Van Alstine (Ohio) 83 N. E. 601.
49N. Y. Law Com., page 48.
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terest in the nature of an expectancy which is supposedly protected
by thL wrongful death statute."
The Supreme Court of the United States has similarly recognized the
"double wrong" sought to be compensated for under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.5 0
From an economic standpoint such a conclusion equally is sound. We have
indicated that the measure of damage fixed under the Death Act never approximates and often falls immeasurably short of the actual value of the life

taken.

By this we mean not the ephemeral value of the life to the individual

or his survivors, which is beyond human computation, but its monetary or
pecuniary value. 5
Just as two separate and distinct rights of action must be
50St. Louis, etc. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 658.
51What the actual or absolute value of a life lost may be was early in the history of our
decisions defined by Justice Lowrie in Penna. R. Co. v. McCloskey, 23 Pa. 526, 531, 532; "The
precept of the law-is, 'Thou shall not by negligence or violence take away the life of another';
and the sanction of the law lies in the duty of compensation for the life destroyed, measured
according to its own merits and not according to the necessities and circumstances of his kindred.
It is very hard to value; but not for that, more uncertain than the speculations in relation to
damages, which ate proposcd in its stead.
"This thought is involved in the whole course of the legislation and jurisprudence already
referred to, and it is a rejection of the idea that the negligence which destroys life is irresponsible, and an assertion of the principle that all negligence must answer for its result, however
serious. We have not heretofire been startled at the absurdity of giving a pecuniary compensation for broken limbs, or ruined health, or shattered intellect, or tarnished reputation.
"If the body be all crushed, we have regarded its sufferings as a subject of civil compensation
so long as life smoulders beneath the ruins; even though there be no capacity to appreciate or
enjoy compensation. We ough, not to be startled that the duty of compensation is continued,
when such life is smothered out.
"We call it compensation, while we admit that money is a very insufficient and uncertain
measure of all such injuries. But it is the best stardard we have, and in practice it is not
found to be alisurd. The duty of the wrongdoer to make compensation is very plain, and such
as he has, which the law can reach, it compels him to give; though it may never reach the
consciousness of the person injured. It is an act of distributive justice in vindication of invaded
right, and it adapts the best approximation to compensation, which the authority of the law -an
enforce. And in these times, when criminal justice presents so many symptoms of going out of
repute, and police officers are so often held up to public indignation for their performance of
duty, it is found to operate well. Call it punitive; yet it is only indirectly so, as all compensation is, and does not wipe out any offence that is involved against the state. From our present
experience and observation, therefore, we are unable to discover any substantial error in the instructions complained of. It would be wrong to limit the value of a man's life by his probable
accumulations, for many men make none in a lifetime, and many have arrived at an age when
they no longer attempt to make any, and many women never make any; and! yet every one is
entitled to his life, and we have as yet discovered no standard for its valuation. It is not human
possessions that are destroyed, but humanity itself; and as this has no market value, it must
necessarily be very much a matter of human feeling.
"'Hard, then, as the task may be, and however uncertain its results, it is to be performed
by the jury, aided by the cautions and counsel of the judge, who has been trained in the consideration of juridical questions. Looking, on the one hand, to the dignity of human nature,
as it has been assailed, and on the other to the position and rights of the defendant, and considering the dignity of their positions as judges of most sacred right, and their own dignity and
responsibility as individuals, and loving meicy even while doing justice, the jury must place
a money value upon the life of a fellow being, very much as they would upon his health or
reputation. The law can furnish no definite measure for damages that are essentially indefinite."
Unfortunately this rule was swiftly departed from under the Act of 1855 and damages were
limited to the pecuniary loss suffered by the survivors in conformity with the decisions of the
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deemed to exist, so each protects or compensates for a specific, individuated loss.
The situation bears striking analogy to the case in which a minor is permanently
injured. It has never been doubted that at common law the two distinct rights
of action exist for the one injury;"2 one being that of the minor who is entitled
to recover for pain, suffering, etc., and any loss of earning power froth his
twenty-first birthday until such time as he shall cease to suffer the loss; the
second that of the parents who sue for expenses incurred and the loss of 'the
minor's probable earnings to the date of his majority. It is only by virtue of
statute that the actions are joined. 53 Precisely the same situation arises in the
case of injury to a married woman. Agaia two separate rights of action arise,
and are joined only by virtue of the statute. 5" In neither case does the dual
obligation present a problem to the courts, for together the damages recovered
fairly and adequately measure the losses occasioned.
So with the existing loss. The Death Act purports to repay to those who
depended upon the decedent for support or received pecuniary advantage from
him, precisely the amount of their loss. 55

The Survival Statute would permit

recovery for that other damage sustained by the injured person himself.
The casual examiner of our decided cases may be led to the conclusion that
both actions may not be sustained simultaneously56 because of language of our
courts in such cases as Birch v. Railway57 and Tayler's Estate.5 A careful
analysis of these decisions will indicate clearly that in them the denial of a dual
right of action is not predicated upon the absence of individual injuries but
upon the specific language of the Death Act. The operation of the act is
conditioned expressly upon the premise that "no suit for damages be brought
by the injured party during his or her life.' 5
'Since no right of action for
per:sonal injury survived unless action had been brought thereon, the rights
were mutually exclusive. This situation is changed entirely by the instant ac
since the decedent's right of action now is made to survive his death even
though no suit has been brought by him during his lifetime. The proviso of
English courts.

Perhaps one of the burdens of this or any other critical article on this subject is

to indicate that this early simple rule worked more complete justice than does the later, more
artificial
measure applied under our statutes.
52 For example: contributory negligence of the parents will constitute a complete bar to
their right
of action but will in no wise affect the minor's right to recover.
634 Act of 1897, P. L. 62; 12 P. S. 1625.
5 Act of 1895, P. L. 54; 12 P. S. 1621.
iS"Upon the injury of a person by the wrongful act of another and his death subsequent to
and as a result of the injury, it would seem at a glance that there have been two wrongs done.
First, there is the wrong to the injured person, giving rise to an action of tort against the wrong,
doer, and secondly the injury to the relatives who, by the death are deprived of support or
financial contribution from the decedent." Schumacher, Rights of' Action Under the Death an,(
Survival Statutes, "23 Mich. L. R. 114 (1924).
Cf. Karzorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438,
441, 442.
6
S Tiffany, op. cit. supra.
57165 Pa. 339.
68179 Pa. 254.
69165 Pa. 339, at 345.
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the Death Act in such cases becomes inapplicable by virtue of its very words,
"during his or her life." Of course, the instant case in no way can be construed to permit the maintenance of two actions if one be that brought by the
decedent during his lifetime.
A careful survey of the law in our sister states and in England is convincing that the dual right of action is both iogical and just. Professor Harper
in his learned treatise on "The Law of Tort" 60 discusses the conflicting views
of many courts as to whether Death Acts provide merely a "substituted" right
dependent upon non-exercise of the decedent's right of action.6' He says: 62
"A number of courts have refused to follow this reasoning, somewhat specious, it must be admitted,63 and have allowed a recovery
under the death statute in spite of a former recovery or settlement
by the injured party before death. It is believed that these latter
are logically sound and socially desirable. They recognize the
distinct and independent social interest protected by the action for
death given by the statute and they thus permit compensation for
harms of different character although arising from the same situation; 6' first the wrong to the injured party in causing pain and
suffering and loss of earning power, and secondly, the wrong to
the surviving spouse, children, or next of kin in the loss by death,
of the pecuniary benefit to be reasonably expected had the injured
party not been killed. The compensation for the first wrong includes only damages sustained by the injured party between the
time of injury and death; for the latter wrong, injuries resulting
from and caused by the death itself. There is, upon this analysis,
'no double recovery' allowed by courts following the minority rule.
On the other hand, the courts following the weight of authority
60(1933) sec. 279.
61Cf. Howard v. Bell Telephone Co., 306 Pa. 518, 522; Hughes v. D. & H. Canal Co.,
176 Pa. 254.

For cases discussing the "substituted right" theory, see 17 Corpus Juris 1185, sec. 38, notes
43, 44. And see Tiffany, op. cit. supra, 29, sec. 23: "It must be admitted that expressions occur
in some of the opinions to the effect that the statute gives a substituted, and not a new, right
of action, but, having regard to the provisions of the act in respect to the persons who are
entitled to the benefit of the action and the measure of damages, such a position is entirely
untenable."
62
1arper, op. cit. supra, at pa e 609.
63Cf. Schumacher, op. cit. suprd,g 114; Tiffany, op. cit. supra, sec. 23.
64Cf. Note 80 U. of Pa. L. R. 993, 995: "It is evident that two interests have been violated
by the same wrong, but as these interests differ innature, and are predicated of different persons,
two causes of action have accrued, one being for the injured party and the other accruing to the
beneficiaries of that person. This statutory cause of the beneficiary is,
an inchoate one, contingent upon actionable negligence on the part of the defendant and upon the death of the
aggrieved person. It depends upon the existence of a cause or right of action in the deceased
before his death only to the extent that there was a wrongful act as towards him. In all other
respects the right of action is a separate and distinct cause, ripening into actual being at the
4noment of death of the injured party."
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are obviously denying compensation for a grave and serious aspect
of the unfortunate situation which gavte rise to the problem.
"The same problem and much the same result is created where a
judgment or settlement has been made by an administrator of a
cause of action under either a survival statute or Lord Campbell's
Act and an action is subsequently started under the other type of
statute. For the most part, the courts have held that the first
recovery bars the second action, ignoring the different wrongs
which the two types of legislation have attempted to remedy. A
minority of cases, however, held otherwise and allowed both
actions. The only justification for the former holding would be
either the theory that a jury in estimating damages would violate
its instructions or unconsciously allow damages for both wrongs in
whichever action was first brought, or a rule of damages which
violates the logic of the two statutes and allows recovery in either
action both for the damages sustained up to the time of death and
those sustained to the beneficiaries after and as a result of death."
The criticism here levelled at the courts may be justified but it is stated
too broadly to be of useful application. A specific analysis of the situation in
our various sister states should prove of considerable assistance in clarifying
our own newly created predicament. No comment is necessary concerning the
situation in states such as Connecticut, New Hampshire, Iowa and Tennessee,6"
wht:re a single act has been construed so as to provide a remedy for both the
personal injury and the death.
In some states such as Michigan and Maine, the application of the Death
Act; is limited to cases of instantaneous death, while all other cases fall under
the Survival Statute. 66 Since such a construction would be repugnant to the

86Kling v. Torrello, (Conn.) 87 A. 987; West v. B. & M. R. R., (N. H.) 129 A. 768;
Union Ry. v. Carter, (Tenn.) 166 S. W. 592; Droullard v. Rudolph, (Ia.) 223 N. W. 100.
Cf. Jones, Civil Liability for Wrongful Death, 10 Ia. L. B. 169. 1 Ia. L. R. 1. But see infra,
note 80.
rhe Iowa rule set forth in the early case of Muldowney v. Railway Co., 36 Ia. 462 was
quoted with approval in Maher v. Phila. Traction Co., 181 Pa. 391, 398, but the Iowa law
has never been followed in our Commonwealth.
6
Dolson v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., (Mich.) 87 N. W. 629; Sooyer v. Perry, (Me.) 33 A. 660;
Oliver v. H. C. St. Ry., (Mich.) 101 N. W. 530. Cf. Boyle, Construction of Survival Act and
Death Act in Michigan, 9 Mich. L. R. 205; Shields, The Death and Survival Acts of Michigan,
3 De:. L. R. 181.
As applied to cases of "instantaneous death" under survival statutes there is respectable
authority for this proposition in many jurisdictions: Cf. The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335 and cases
cited in extenso in 17 Corpus Juris 1197, note 83. Contra see ibid, note 84. Harper, op,
cit. supra, 607, sec, 279,
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long history of judicial construction of our own Death Act,67 in which it has
been applied equally to both types of cases, it may be disregarded as a possible
precedent.
In others, such as Alabama, Kansas, Illinois and Rhode Island, the application of the Survival Statute is limited to cases in which death results from
causes other than the injuries inflicted by the tort-feasor.68 Since our courts
have already reached a contrary conclusion69 on this specific point, we may not
assume such a solution.
Kentucky requires an election of remedies,70 a conclusion which is the result
of fear of double recovery rather than logic.7 1 We have examined sufficiently
the divergent nature of the two actions and the diversity of interests involved
to indicate the oppressiveness of such a rult.
Sixteen states permit the institution and prosecution of both actions in all
or some types of cases, thereby protecting both individual interests and at the
same time avoiding any danger of a double recovery.
Georgia presents a situation strikingly analogous to our own. Two
separate and distinct actions there may be maintained: one by the administrator
for all damages incurred to the date of the death of the injured person; the
second by the widow, etc., for "the full value of the life of thL deceased."
These rights in no manner affect each other and even an adverse verdict in one
72
will not bar the other.
In Arkansas an earlier Survival Statute co-exists with the later Death Act
in the Code. It is held that two separate rights of action are conferred 7 8"one for the benefit of tht estate, to recover damages which decedent could
have recovered had he survived the accident, 7 4 and the other for the benefit
6"For example: the case of Moe v. Smiley, 125 Pa. 136, presented a typical case of in.
stantaneous death, having arisen from a shooting stated to have been murder. It was concluded
by the8 court that the death act gave the survivor a right of action against the tort-feasor.
6 Bruce v. Collier, (Ala) 129 So. 553; Sewell v. A. T. & S. Ry., (Kan.) 96 Pac. 1007;
Holton v. Daly, 106 Il. 131; Lubrano v. Atlantic Mills Co., (R. 1.) 32 A. 205.
69Birch v. Railway, 165 Pa. 339.
70C. & 0. Ry. v. Banks, (Ky.) 135 S. W. 285; cf. Ohio cases, infra note 110; Virginia,
infra 7note 155.
1"This rule may seem arbitrary inasmuch as the action- for injuries was one belonging to
the decedent existing at common law which survived . . . and the recovery belongs to his estate;
whereas the action for wrongful death is a new action which did, not exist at common law and
never belonged to the decedent and the recovery is not assets..." Dean Evans, Death by
Wrongful
Act-Survivorship of Tort Actions in Kentucky, 21 Ky. L. J. 369.
7
Spradlin v. Georgia R. and E. Co., 77 S. E. 799; Augusta Ry. Co. v. Glover, 18 S. E.
406. The court in the first case refused to pass upon the prior decision by a divided court in
So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cassin, 36 S. E. 881, that the settlement of the personal injury claim
during the decedent's lifetime constituted a bar to the death action. It is probable that
the strong dissenting opinion would now be followed should the case again arise.
7SUnfortunately the otherwise clear logic of the decisions in this state is clouded by the
holding in Crockett v. Missouri P. R. Co., 16 S. W. (2d) 989, ithat a release executed by the
injured person during his lifetime bars a subsequent death action. The court did not consider the
ultimate problem involved nor the cases here cited and relied for its holding solely upon cases
in which releases of personal injury claims were held to completely bar actions for such injuries.
7'4St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Roberson, 146 S. W. 482.
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of the widow and next of kin, for damages which they sustained by reason of

the death . . ..76 "The actions are prosecuted in different rights, and the
76
damages are given upon different principles to compensate different injuries."'
Uhder the Louisiana code one action is brought for both injuries,"
although they are recognized as giving rise to independent rights of action.78
Despite the single survival action for death given by the general Iowa
statutes,7 9 a peculiar situation exists in cases involving the death of minor
children. It is there held that two actions may be prosecuted simultaneously;
one by the parents for their prospective pecuniary loss during the minority of
the child and the other by an administrator for damage which would accrue
subsequent to majority.8 0
In Indiana it is held that the common law rights of action of a parent for
the loss of the services of a minor child 8 l and of a husband for the loss of
so:ikty and services of a wife82 survive in the absence of statute, and are
independent of the death action granted by statute to those pecuniarily injured.
Where no guardian exists to act for the minor, the parent may recover both
measures of damage in a single action.83
Maryland recognizes the right of two independent actions upon the
separate causes arising from the injury and death. 8 ' It logically holds that
an action begun by the deceased does not abate at his death,8 5 but anomalously
reaches the decision that a release of his right of action by the injured person
constitutes a complete bar to an action under the Death Act.86
The same conclusions are reached in South Carolina. 7 The right of
action88 or action already begun8 9 survive in addition to the right under the
Dcath Act but a lifetime release constitutes a bar. 90 ThL personal representa75St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Corman, 122 S. W. 116, 119, citing Davis v. Railway, 13
S. W. 801.
"6Murphy v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 122 S. W. 636, 638, citing Railway v. Sweet, 40
S. W. 463.
7
" Eichorn v.,,New Orl. & C. R. L. & P. Co., 36 So. 335.
78Underwood v. Gulf Refining Co., 55 So. 641; Dougherty v. New Orl. R. & L. Co., 63
So. 493; compare Chanson v. Morgan's La. & T. R. Co., 136 So. 647; 6 Tul. L. R. 201-43.
79Cf. note 65 supra.
8
OWalters v. Chicago,,etc. R. Co., 36 Ia. 458.
8
1Louisville, etc. Co. v. Goddy Koontz, 119 Ind. 111.
8
21nd. Transit Co. v. Reeder, 42 Ind. App. 520.
83Mayhen v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328.
84Md. Code, Art. 67, sec. 1, and Art. 93, sec. 106; Stewart v. United Elec. Co., 104 Md.
334: Melitch v. United Rys. Co., 121 Md. 463; White v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 140 Md. 594;
cf. 30 Il. L. R. 243.
85
Stewart v. United Elec. Co., supra.
8
6Melitch v. United Rys. Co., supra.
87S. C. Code of 1932, secs. 411 and 419.
88
Bennett v. Spartensburg, etc., Co., 81 S. E. 189.
9
s Claussen v. Brothers, 145 S. E. 539.
9ORish v. Seaboard A. L. Co., 90 S. E. 704; Price v. Richmond, etc., Co., 12 S. E. 143.
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tive, who is authorized to bring both suits, may not join them because of the
essential difference between the two capacities in which he sues.91
In Oregon it is provided specifically that the cause of action for personal
injuries shall not survive, 92 and the measure of damage under the Death Act
is the full value of the life lost. 93 It consistently is held that it is immaterial
whether or not the death is instantaneous.94 However, in the case of the death
of a minor, the personal representative may sue for the death 95 and, if the
parental relationship exists, the parent may sue simultaneously for loss of
services. 96
In California the death action given to parents of a minor or the representative of an adult 97 is independent entirely of the representative's right to
prosecute a survival action whther the status of employer and employee
existed.98
Washington 9 sustains the right to two separate, independent and concurrent actions' 00 which may be joined in a singl- suit." ' However, it follows
the illogical rule that the death action is barred by a release executed by the
102
deceased.
Nebraska has worked out the logical solution of the problem to the full
extent. Here the two causes of action are recognized as separate and distinct
but may be joined in a single suit and determined by separate verdicts, but if
not joined, a judgment in either case is no bar to the other.10 8 Consequently,
a suit started in the lifetime of the injured person may be revived and amended
so as to include damages for the death. 104 Although the double remedy is
recognized, double recovery is prevented by limiting damages in the survival
suit to those sustained during the lifetime, except where no beneficiaries named
in the Death Act exist. This contingency is also covered:
"Before his death he had a right to recover the total loss of
earnings, based upon his full expectancy of life; but when death
91Granger
v. Greenville, etc., Ry. Co., 85 S. E. 968.
92
0re. Code of 1930, secs. 5-701-703.
8
1 Staats v. Twoley Bros., 123 Pac. 909.
94
Perharn v. Portland Elec. Co., 53 Pac. 14.
9Shleiger
v. No. Terminal Co., 72 Pac. 324.
6
99 Putnam v. So. Pac. Co., 27 Pac. 1033.
7Cal. Code Civil Proc., Sec. 377; Civil Code, Sec. 1970.
98Taylor
v. Albion Lumber Co., 168 Pac. 348; Gonsalves v. Petalinna, etc., Co., 159 Pac. 724.
9
O Rem. Rev. Stat., secs. 183-194.
1OOMachek v. Seattle, 203 Pac. 25; Swanson v. Pac. Shipping Co., 110 Pac. 795; Grant v.
Fisher F. M. Co., 44 Pac. (2d) 193.
10'Whiting v. Seattle, 258 Pac. 824; cf. State v. Vinther, 48 Pac. (2d) 915; Mitchell '.
Rice, 48 Pac. (2d) 949; Ryan v. Poole, 47 Pac. (2d) 981.
10Brodie v. Wash. W. P. Co., 159 Pac. 791.
N. W. 153.
10SHindmarsh v. Sulpho.Saline Bath Co., 187 N. W. 806; cf. In re Grainger's Estate, 237

N. W.4 153.

lO Rasmussen v. Benson, 275 N. W. 674.
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occurred the actual duration and period of his life became definite
and fixed and no longer open to question, and, having left a
widow and next of kin, a new cause of action sprang up in their
favor, entitling them to recover, for themselves exclusively, a
portion of the total loss which has grown out of the extinguishment
of the deceased's earning capacity. And where no persons exist
to benefit by the death action the survival statute
gives the full
1 05
measure to the representative in the one action."
Montana recognizes that the right to a survival action is independent
entirely of the right of action created by the Death Act, 106 but limits the
107
application of the statute to cases in which death is not instantaneous.
Ohio has considered extensively the questions here discussed. In addition
to the usual Death Act' 0s it has a Survival Statute comparable to our own
act.'-09 The nature of the respective actions was fully considered in a case
where the administrator had prosecuted and lost a survival action, and a death
action was then brought. It was argued that since the parties and defenses to
the two suits are identical the prior determination constituted a bar. The court
held contra on the basis that one action is for the exclusive benefit of the
survivors and the other for the estate, subject to the claims of creditors. In
holding that two distinctly different rights were involved, the court said:
"It is the death which is the foundation of this action and not the
injury . . . . the two actions, although instituted by the same
personal representative, are not in the same right, and that a
judgment for the defendant in one case is not a bar to a recovery
in the other." 11 0
Simillarly this court has held that a recovery by the administrator in a suit
brought by the deceased is no bar to the death action, saying:"'
"The right of th- administrator, therefore, to recover in the
reviewed action, rested upon the common law right of action
inhering in the injured person .. "
In Oklahoma the same situation exists. The suit of the injured person
survives independently of the right of action for death and both may be
lOOMurray v. Omaha Transfer Co., 153 N. W. 488.
10ORev. Code, sec. 6494; Melzner v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., 127 Pac. 146.
107Dillon v. Great No. Ry. Co., 100 Pac. 960.
10SGen. Code, 10770-10772.
lOGen. Code, 11235: "In addition to the causes which survive at common law, causes of
action ]or . . . . injuries to the person . . . . also shall survive .... "

IlOMay Coal Co. v. Robinette, 165 N. E. 576; citing Cinn. Trac. Co. v. Ginnochio, 102
N. E. 1120; Wellston Iron F. Co. v. Rinehart, N. E. 623; St. Louis, etc., Co. v. Craft, 237
U. S. 648.
la:tMahoning Val. Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, 83 N. E. 601, 603.
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prosecuted at once. Double recovery is prevented by confining damages in
the survival suit to those incurred prior to death.11 2 It is held logically that
a release by the injured party constitutes no bar to the death action."$
South Dakota permits two independent actions,11 4 limiting damages in
the survival suit to those accruing before death,115 and holding that instantaneous death gives no such cause of action.' 1 6 A release by the deceased is no
bar to the death action."17
Florida has the usual Death Act 1 8 under which damages are measured
as in Pennsylvania." t 9 However, a separate statute provides that for the death
of a minor damages may be recovered for the mental pain and suffering of the
suing father (or mother where there is no father).12o In such case the surviving parent has two causes of action, one under the general act and the other
under the specific statute, but double recovery is avoided by reason of the
different measures of damage.' 2' A general survival statute preserving causes
of action for personal injuries also exists,' 22 but no case has been noted in
which the question of conflict has arisen in the death of an adult. Since the
optional right of recovery under the then existing Employers' Liability Act
was recognized,' 28 it is probable (hat both actions would be sustained.
On the other hand some states have solved the problem in a single act.
In Massachusetts the necessity of bringing two actions is obviated by legislative
provision that a count for conscious suffering12 4 and consequential damage' 2'
may be included in the death action, so as to join both actions in one.' 26 The
two counts, however, are still treated as being separate and distinct.' 27 The
1 12

St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Goode, 142 Par. 1185. The case of St. Louis, etc., Co. v..Thompson, 281 Pac. 565, is often cited as authority for the proposition that two actions do not exist.

A careful reading of the case will indicate that the decision is that two death actions cannot be
brought by different survivors.
ttSStokes
v. Collum Commerce Co., 252 Pac. 390.
4

tl Rowe v. Richards, 142 N. W. 664.

I5Ibid.
v. Black Hills, etc., Co., 53 N. W. 750.
'I6Belding
11
7Rowe v. Richards, 151 N. W. 1001.
"SaComp. Gen. Laws, secs. 7047, 7048.
5
" 9Cudahy Packing Co. v. Ellis, 141 So. 918.
l20Comp. Gen. Laws, sec. 7049; but the father cannot recover for the mental anguish of
the mother: Coon v. Atlantic C-L Ry. Co., 171 So. 207.
121Miami Dairy Farms v. Tinsley, 155 So. 850.
122Comp. Gen. Laws, sec. 4211: State v. Parks, 175 So. 786; Waller v. First Sav. & T.
Co., 138 So. 780.

123Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Rhoda, 71 So. 369.

124Am. Laws, C. 229.6; Act of 1911. The count for conscious suffering existed at common
law: Brennan v. Standard Oil Co., 73 N. E. 472.
125Act of 1934, C. 228, sec. I.,

126Gilpatrick v. Cotting, 10t N. E. 993; but they must be joined; Neiss v. Buriven, 191

N. E. 654.

l27McCarthy v. Wood Lumber Co., 107 N. E. 439; Elridge v. Barton, 122 N. E. 272;
Avery v. Forand, 200 N. E. 926.
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instantaneous death rul- is28 applied but a very brief period of life is sufficient
1
to give rise to the count.
In Mississippi'2 9 the Death Act is supplemented by the Survival Statute
"
but the Death
in a case where a suit begun by the injured party is revived
Act action is exclusive if no suit was instituted for the personal injury since
this act consolidated all actions and gave damages for all injuries to all parties
in cases of death. 13' Naturally it is held that a release given or judgment
2
obtained by the injured person constitutes a bar to the death action.13 The
38
instantaneous death rule is applied.'
In England the dual right of action is recognized:
"Where the deceased himself had a cause of action which survivcs
him . . . .his personal representative has a double right of action;
he can sue both on behalf of the deceased's estate and also on
34
behalf of the relatives."'
In other respects the law resembles our own; judgment, release or contributory
negligence constituting complete loss.'3 6 Distribution of the fund raised is
controlled by the court.'1 8
A few examples of states reaching the opposite conclusion should be
noted. In Missouri'3 7 only one cause of action exists 33 unless death results
from causes other than the injuries."19
The New Mexico Survival Act refers only to "injury to real or personal
estate" 1 0 and so should not affect the Death Act."' However, the latter is
construed broadly:
"The statute clearly contemplates a recovery even if there be no
surviving kindred of the favored classes."
42
Hence substantial damages are recoverable without actual proof of loss.'
12Royal Ind. Co. v. Pittsfield Elec. Co., 199 N. E. 69.
129Code 1906, 1908; secs. 2091, 2093, 721.
3
l 0Hamel v. So. Ry. Co., 66 So. 426, 809.
3
1 1Mobile v. Hicks, 46 So. 360, 394; and see Hamel v. So. Ry. Co., 66 So. at 810.
la2Harris v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 71 So. 878. The court, however, relies upon the doubtful theory that the language of the act precludes recovery; see note 35, supra.
C. R. Co. v. Pendergrass, 12 So. 954; McVey v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 19 So. 209.
133111inois
l:34Salmond on Torts, page 369, quoting Leggott v Gt. N. Ry. Co., 19 Q. B. D. 599.
131tRead v. Gt. E. Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555; Salmond on Torts, page 367.
36
l Bulmer v. Bulmer, 25 Ch. D, 409.
15'7Mo. St. Ann. sec. 3262, et seq.
"11SJordan v. St. Jos., etc. Co., 73 S. W. (2d) 205; Hendricks v. Kauffman, 101 S. W. (2d)
v. Ross, 71 S. W. (2d) 124.
84; Walker
9
l11 Beer v. Martel, 55 S. W. (2d) 482; Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 79 S. W. (2d) 109.
14,01938 St. 105-1202; this is taken from the Kansas statute: Frompton v. Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 217 Pac. 694; see note 68, supra.

1411938 St. 36-104; no case discussing the possible conflict has been found.
' ,Hogsett v. Hanna, 63 Pac. (2d) 540, 545; citing Whitoner v. El Paso, etc., Co., 201 Fed.
193; Cerrillos C. R. Co. v. Deserant, 49 Pac. 807.
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In North Carolina the Death Act 1' 8 creates a new cause of action' 44 but its
purpose is to continue the right of action for wrongful injury to the person.' s
The Survival Statute 14 6 does not apply where death results from the injury but
may apply if it results from other causes,14 7 hence there is no conflict between
them."48 A release by the injured person is held to be a bar to the death
149
action.
The Utah Death Act 5 0 is construed similarly to our own1 51
' except in cases
of wilful and malicious injury where damages for mental anguish ar& allowed. 162
The Survival Statute' 5 has been held to be inapplicable to personal injury cases
and even a pending action abates at the death of the injured person. 154
In Virginia, although only one action is permitted, 56 damages may be
recovered for loss of care, attention and society, sorrow and mental anguish,
156
in addition to the pecuniary loss and punitive damage.
The same is true under the Death Act of West Virginia. 6 7 It is provided
specifically that compromise and satisfaction of the claim of the injured person
(other than a minor) constitutes a bar to the death action.' 58 The act covers
all deaths, whether instantaneous or not.' 59
Wyoming has a Death Act'1 0 which is construed like our own, applicable
to all deaths. 161 It also has a statute causing pending actions to survive, 162
but the courts to date have expressly refused to determine whether the two
actions can be prosecuted simultaneously.168
In Texas the Death Act'6 4 is held to provide the sole remedy in cases
Code, sees. 160, 161.
144Cf. 11 N. C. L. R. 263.
5
14 Mitchell v. Talley, 109 S. E. 882.
1461935 Code, sees. 159, 461.
7
14 Fuguay v. A. & W. Ry. Co., 199 N. C. 499; cf. J. Baird Co. v. Boyd, 41 Fed. (2d) 578.
148Peebles
v. N. C. R. Co., 63 N. C. 238.
9
14 Edwards v. Interstate Chem. Co., 87 S. E. 635.
1501933 Rev. St., 104-3-11.
151Evans v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 108 Pac. 638; Webb v. Denver etc., Ry. Co., 24 Pac.
616; Parmley v. Pleasant Val. C. Co., 228 Pac. 557.
15'Vanderberg v. Connoly, 54 Pa. 1097.
1511933
Rev. St., 104-3-19.
4
15 Mason v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 24 Pac. 796; cf. the strong dissent of Anderson, J., at 798.
ISSAnderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co., 24 S. E. 269; Brauner v. N. & W. Ry., 57 S. E. 593;
Virginia, etc., Co. v. Odle's Adm., 105 S. E. 107.
ls6Cases supra, note 155.
1"tCode of 1937, secs. 5686, 5474-5; cf. Kelley v. Ohio R. R. Co., 52 S. E. 520; Wigal
v. Parkersburg, 81 S. E. 554.
158Hoover v. Chesapeake etc. R. Co., 33 . E. 224; Peters v. Kanauha B. & T. Co., 191
S. E. 581; Fetty v. Carroll, 190 S. E. 683.
159Swope v. Keystone C. & C. Co., 89 S. E. 284.
1601931 Rev. Stat., sec. 89-403.
161Coliseun Motor Co. v. Hester, 3 Pac. (2d) 105.
1621931 Rev. Stat., se,.. 89-1236.
16SColiseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 3 Pac. (2d) 105 at page 107.
4
16 Vernon St. (1936) sec. 4671.4672.
1481935
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where death results from the injury;'" and the Survival Statute'" protects
from abatement actions for personal injuries only in cases where death results
from other causes. 111 Contributory negligence of the survivors is no bar to
the death action. 168
17 0
does
In Idaho'1 9 the same result is reached since the Survival Statute
nct preserve either actions or causes of action for personal injuries."' Th
12
protection,
measure of damage, however, includes loss of companionship,
178
bodily care, intellectual culture and moral training.
5
Colorado's Death Act for railroad accidents174 is penal in character,1 but
6
acts'"7
reckless
and
wanton
of
in
cases
except
the general Death Act is not''
and it is barred by-a release during lifetime. The Survival Statute expressly
78
and has been
ext-epts actions of trespass for injuries done to the person,'
179
But an action for personal injuries
held to apply to causes of action as well.
based upon a contract of carriage survives.'8 0
The Nevada statute has been construed to permit both compensatory
damages and exemplary damages where wantonness and recklessness are
shown.' 82 The Survival Statute refers only to "actions" and apparently has
ss
never been construed in connection with the Death Act.'
8
does not appear to have received conThe North Dakota Death Act'
struction in connection with the statute providing for, the survival of existing
actions.185
In Wisconsin the early Survival Statute, similar to our own early acts, did
not relate to causes of actions and it was held that the Death Act was the sole
ireiedy. 186 Under the later general Survival Statute, however, the cause of
t65Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sullivan, 190 S. W. 739; Norman v. Valley Gin Co., 99
S. W. (2d) 1065.
166Vernon St. (1936) sec. 5525-8306.
'6/Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sullivan, supra.
8
16 Dallas Ry. & Term. Co. v. High, 103 S. W. (2d) 735; overruling Galveston etc. Co.
v. KLtac, 11 S. W. 127, 13 S. W. 327.
t691932 Code Ann. 5-310, 311.

17OIbid, 5-319.
v. Stelle, 249 Pac. 254.
t711MacLeod
72

Anderson v. Great No. R. Co., 99 Pa. 91; Kelly v. Lemhi Ir.

1

Co., 168 Pac.

1076.

:MWyland v. Twin Falls C. Co., 285 Pac. 676.
.'.42
Colo. St. Ann. C. 50, sec. 1.
75
1 Denver etc. R. Co. v. Frederic, 140 Pac. 463.
1.76C.
50, secs. 2, 6, Hayes v. Williams, 30 Pac. 352.
77
I Lindsay v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 226 Fed. 23, 26.
1784 Colo. Stat. Ann. C. 176, sec.
79

147.

l Micheletti v. Moidel, 32 Pac. (2d) 266.
8
1 OKelley v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 27 Pac. 1058.
181Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 9194, 8553-4.
182Pardini v. City of Reno, 263 Pac. 768; cf. Nordyke v. Pastrell, 7 Pac. (2d) 598; Per:y
Min. Co., 13 Fed. (2d) 865.
v. Tonopah
88
' Comp. Laws, sec. 8561. It is patterned, however, after the California Act and would
probably
4 receive the same construction.
13 Comp. Laws 1913, sec. 8321-8323 as amended 1925 Supp.
351bid, sec. 7408.
136Randall v. Northwestern Tel. Co., 11 N. W. 419.
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action survives to the administrator without affecting the death action, 8 7 but
the action of the injured person may not be amended so as to include damages
for the death.1 8
We have purposely withheld consideration of the law in New York.
Prior to 1935 there was no Survival Statute applicable to personal injury
cases,"8 9 and settlement by the injured person was held to constitute a bar to
the death action.18 0 The question of the creation of a double recovery was
before the courts, and the reaction there is of great interest: 191
"There can be no doubt that the legislature had power to create
the double liability contended for, nor would it necessarily involve
any inconsistency. The damages of the party injured are different
and distinguishable from those which his next of kin sustain by
his death, and no double recovery of the same damages would
result."
The harshness of the existing law was recognized by the New York Commission
on the Administration of Justice and a bill was introduced in the Legislature
of 1934 to remedy it.192
Under its terms all causes of action and actions for torts would have
survived without limitation as to the damages recoverable, and the wrongful
death action would have been preserved. Hence the Commission's proposal
would have created a situation precisely similar to our own at the present time.
The recommended statute, however, was not passed, and in 1935 the Law
Revision Commission undertook a new study of the subject heretofore mentioned.
Its recommendations substantially were enacted in 1935 so that the present law
provides for two independent actions' 98 which may be consolidated, or the
complaint in a lifetime suit may be enlarged to include the damages for
death. 1 4 Double recovery is prevented by a provision limiting the damages
in the survival action to those accruing before death. 195
Not only from our analysis of our existing situation, but also from the
development of the law in other states, we are forced to the inevitable conclusion
that a dual right of action is now to be supported by a dual remedy, and a
7

18 Brown v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 78 N. W. 771; Nemecek v. Filer & S. Co., 105 N. W.
225.

18SQuinn v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 124 N. W. 653.
189The death act was Dec. Est. Law, secs. 130-134; cf. N. Y. Law Con. op, cit. notel,
page 40.
190Littlewood v. New York, 89 N. W. 24.
19'lbid. Cf. Justice Steur, The Action for Wrongful Death in New York, 12 N. Y. U.
L. R. 388.
2
19 Leg. Doc. (1934), No. 50 (D), pp. 20-21.
8
19 Dec. Est. Law, sec. 119, 120.
194Ibid, sec. 120.

lOSIbid.
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"double recovery" must now be permitted. 196 The final question for determination is the measure of damage to be applied. Our conclusion, unsatisfactory
though it may seem, is compelled by the existing law: that the already established and well recognized measures in each of the two types of cases must be
accepted and applied until legislative action correlates the subject. The survivors under the Death Act still must recover the actual pecuniary loss suffered
by them. The personal representative, on tht other hand, now will commence
97
and prosecute an action whose measure has been determined in many cases
in which he has been called upon merely to prosecute heretofore by way of
suriivorship. The action is the same, the measure of damage can hardly now
be declared to be different except by legislative mandate.
In Maher v. P. R. T.198 our Supreme Court said: 199
".... .it logically follows that the damages recoverable by her
personal representative should be the same as she could have recovered had death not ensued. Included therein are damages for
pain and suffering up to the time of her death, and diminution of
earning power during a period of life which she would have
probably lived had the accident not happened. It is a mistake to
suppose that the recovery in this case is for the death. It is still
for the personal injury. .

.

. 'It is idle to say that when a man

L5o6Cf. Lutge v. Rosin, 32 D. & C. 338, 347. The same argument against "double recovery" was answered in Ohio: "At least, it cannot avail if the right to a second action where
death results from the injury is given by the statute." Mahoning Val. R. Co. v. Van Alstine,
83 N. E. 601.
:L97Survival of an action actually begun during the lifetime of the injured party is not a

novel subject.

It has been provided for by the Acts of 1834, P. L. 73, sec. 28; 1851, P. J.

669, sec. 18; and 1917, P. L. 447, sec. 35 (a)

the constitutionality of which'was not affected

by the decision in Strain v. Kern.
Cf. N. Y. Law Com. page 44: "Should there be any difference whether or not the action
is already instituted at the time of death? The theory upon which this distinction is based in
those jurisdictions making such distinction isapparently that the claim is an asset of the estate
if already sued upon because the claimant has so willed it. It is submitted that the basis of such
distinction is erroneous and the argument without weight."
]bid 48, note 2: "The fact that deceased had commenced the action in his lifetime should
not he material in fixing the measure of recovery, unless we are to adopt the peculiar theory
that only actions survive and that rights or causes of action do not survive."
In Lutge v. Rosin, 32 D. & C. 338, 343 the Court of Common Pleas No. 7 of Philadelphia
County held: "Obviously, this is not a new cause of action but simply a survival of the catise
of action which the deceased already had.

It follows that the damages recoverable are no differ'

ent from those which the decedent himself could have recovered had he lived to bring the action,
and so the courts have universally held, in absence of an express statutory provision that a

different measure of damages be substituted. See Kyes v. Valley Telephone Co., 132 Mich. 281;
Oliver v. Houghton County Street-Ry. Co., 134 Mich. 367." And again at page 348: "There is

no indication in the act, nor has any authority been discovered to the effect, that a different
measure of damages is to be applied in the one type of suit than in the other."
198181 Pa. 391.
199At pages 397, 398, 399.
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is killed by unlawful violence it is not an injury to his person.' 200
One element of the injury in such case is the total impairment of
the earning power, placed beyond the possibility of doubt by the
death, and hence a simpler problem for the jury, but the measure
of damages tlberefor is the same as if the party had survived ....
"In an action that has survived to and is prosecuted by the personal representative, under the statute, there can doubtless be a
recovery, not only for mental and physical suffering of the injured
decedent, but also for the value of his life. .

.

. With us, however,

the right to recover a solatium necessarily follows from the fact
tht the action, as brought by the injured party, is continued by
the statute."
the
This was followed by many decisions which elaborated and 2 reaffirmed
2

principles stated.

2
In McCafferty v. R. R. Co.,

°1

the court said:

"If the action is continued for the benefit of the estate, the
measure of damages is the loss sustained by the injured party ....
the damages recovered by her personal representatives should be
the same as she could have recovered had death not ensued. Included therein are damages for her pain and suffering up to the
time of her death, and diminution of earning power during a
period of life which she would have probably lived had the accident
not happened . .

.

.the value of the advantages of which the in-

jured party was deprived because of the diminution or loss of
earning power."
In cases involving injuries to and deaths of minors .the same principles
naturally would be applied: the death action of the survivors for pecuniary
loss suffered by them would be supplemented by the survival action of the
administrator. The measure of damage in the latter suit should be the same
as in that brought on behalf of the minor during his lifetime: the pain and
suffering during life and the probable loss of earning power after his majority.208 For the death of a married woman the measure in the latter action
would be pain and suffering and loss of any independent earning power she
200
Moe v. Smiley, 125 Pa. 136, 141. Cf. the language of the Superior Court in Crider v.
Moorhead, 51 Pa. Super. 532, 537; "Death might be the immediate and direct consequence of
the negligent act. In such case, of course, no right of action ever vested in the injured party."
The fallacy of this fogic has been demonstrated, supra.
201-193 Pa. 339; cf. Lutge v. Rosin, 32 D. & C. 338, 344: "To contend that some distinction, should be made between the damages that the personal representative may recover
where the action survives to him and where the cause of action survives to him, and that in the
latter case the Death Act measure of damages should apply, is to ignore the essential difference
between the Death Act and the Survival Statute."
202At page 346.
20
BFedorawicz v. Citizens Elec. Co., 246 Pa. 141.
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might have had, since in her lifetime her independent earnings would have
204
belonged to her and not to her husband.
There will be an objection promptly that the tort-feasor now will be forced
to pay in excess of the true, measurable, pecuniary value of the life. Until the
legi:slature, in its wisdom, sees fit to codify the law on this subject 205 the tortfeasor will pay excessively, but will have great difficulty in finding the legal
philosopher who will waste sympathy upon him.20 6 As we have indicated heretofore this is precisely thL result recommended by the New York Commission oti
207
the Administration of Justice.
THE REMEDY
It has been suggested that if the courts would recognize the full logic of
the decisions which hold that two separate and distinct rights of action exist 0 8
and would pursue this logic into the field of damages, a highly desirdble result
would be achieved.209 This would entail the limitation of damages under thl
Death Act to the pecuniary loss occasioned to the survivors and the damages
under the Survival Statute to those accruing up to the time of the death of the
deceased, as has been done in New York.210 It is argued that in this manner
204Standen
v. P. R. R. Co., 214 Pa. 189.
5
20 Although the Legislature has, at almost every session, had before it many Bills to amend
the death acts, none to our knowledge have attempted or purported to cover the entire field as
is suggested herein.
206The question of punitive damages was specifically considered in Palmer v. Phila., etc. R.
Co., 218 Pa. 114. After reviewing the cases extensively, the conclusion was reached that there

could be no recovery under the death act beyond purely compensatory damages. A, great deal
of influence seems to have been followed from the Act of 1868, P. L. 58 declaring the "pecuniary
loss" rule in railroad cases, although the rule itself was well entrenched in the general field by
the time this case reached the courts. The discussion in this case, however, -is dictum, and.
although no case has ever permitted the recovery of punitive damages in Pennsylvania, a careful
study of the cases will indicate that the question may still be an open one.
It is interesting to note that the expressed intention of the early Alabama statute was to
punish the tort-feasor and evidence of loss of services, pecuniary loss, or mental suffering were
equally immaterial: Richmond v. D. R. Co., 11 So. '800; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Burgess, 22
So. 913; Randle v. B. Ry. L. & P. Co., 53 So. 918. In Connecticut the statute was said to
be partly penal or punitive: Broughel v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 48 A. 751. Punitive damages
could be recovered in cases of gross negligence or wilful act in Kentucky: St. 1909, sec. 6.
In Missouri in addition to the compensatory right of action it was provided that in most types
of cases a forfeiture of between $2,000 and $10,000 could be sued for: 'Rev. Stat. 1909, sec.
5425; Boyd v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 139 S. W. 561; Shaffer v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 245
S. W. 257, 263 U. S. 687; as to Colorado see Rev. St. 1908, sec. 2056, 2059; New Mexico,
Comp. Laws 1897, sec. 3213-3215; Nevada, Gen. St. 1855, sec. 3898, 3899; Teas, Rev. St.
1895, art. 3019, and see H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31. Cf. Cooley, op.cit. supra,
sec. 219, notes 9 to 14, inc. West Virginia: Searle v. Kanawha, 9 S. E. 248; Turner v. Nolfolk etc. R. Co., 22 S. E. 83; Virginia: Norfolk etc. R. Co. v. Cheatwood, 49 S. E. 489; New
Mexico provided a $5000 penalty under the Act of 1882: 1915 Code, sec. '1820, Clay v. Atchison,
etc. Ri. Co., 228 S. W. 907; South Carolina provided for exemplary damages: 1932 Code, sec.
412, Osteen v. So. Ry., 57 S. E. 196; and in Massachusetts punitive damages are assessed according to the degree of culpability of the defendant: Macchioroli v. Howell, 200 N. E. 905.
207Cf.
N. Y. Law Com. page 8; see also text and note 191 supra.
2 8
(1 See op. cit. note 47.
2(19We revert to the earliest rule laid down in our courts, see note 51. Cf. Schumacker,
op. cit. supra, at pages 126, 127, 128; 44 Harv. L. R. 980.
210Cf. notes 193-195 supra.
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there would be avoided the award of the probable contributions of the deceased
to his survivors in addition to the loss of 'earnings out of which such contributions would have been paid.
The fallacy in applying such a rule lies in the fact that the joint measure
of damage so established falls short of a fair estimate of the actual loss suffered.
For example: a man earring $3000 per year contributes $1500 to his family,
requires $1000 for himself, and saves $500. The total annual actual pecuniary
loss suffered by reason of his death is $2000, $1500 to his family and $500 to
his estate. The suggested measure fails to consider the latter item. Consider
the situation of a father or mother in better than moderate circumstances.
Children of such parents are furnished with the necessities and conveniences
of life and the loss of these would be the measure of their damage under the
suggested rule. But in addition thereto such a parent customarily and systematically sets aside a fund for use of the children upon the happening of certain
contingencies. If this fund is in any form other than life insurance, the right
to recover damage for the loss of 'expected contributions to it is lost.
In these and many similar cases the suggested remedy is as unfair to thb
2 11
as the present state of the law 2 t 2 is to the defendant.
parties plaintiff
The clear and unmistakable answer to this puzzling situation is a codification of the acts in question establishing a fair and adequate but not vindictive
measure of damage. 21 s This should include damages for (1) pain, suffering,
humiliation, disfigurement and loss of members during the lifetime of the
injured party; (2) expenses incurred by reason of the injury and death (medical,
nursing, hospital, funeral, transportation and identification); (3) the total loss
suffered by reason of the death, measured in the ordinary case by the loss to
the estate, which would include pecuniary loss to the survivors and probable
accumulations of the deceased and would be determined by the loss of earning
power to the end of his expectancy;2 14 and in the case of minors and married
women by the loss of society and companionship, services, consortium and
assistance.
44 Harv. L. R. 980.
2IICf.
2
21 As herein interpreted.
2131t has been well stated in 44 Harv. L. R. 980, 984: "Whatever desirable results have
been reached in particular problems are due more largely to fortuitous judicial interpretation
than to adequate statutory structure. There is an obvious need for the reconsideration of this
legislation with a view to its complete and workmanlike revision."
The practical impossibility of having a uniform act adopted is conceded by Wendell D. Allen
in his address delivered before the American Bar Association, July 26, 1938, on the subject of
"'Conflict in Laws of Various States Regarding Negligence Resulting in Death."
2t4Cf. cases cited supra notes 197 to 202 inclusive.
Cf. Olivier v. Houghton Co. Ry. Co., (Mich.) 101 N. W. 530: "When the deceased received his injury, he stood entitled to recover then and there the loss sustained by being
deprived of the power to earn money during the period he would have lived, had he not
suffered the injury. It would not, under these decisions, have been any answer for defendant
to say that, 'while this is precisely what we -have deprived you of, you cannot recover at all,
as we have, in addition to crippling you, shortened your life.'"

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

For the protection of the survivors tht recovery should be exempt from
the claims of creditors2 15 except those claims arising directly from the injury
and death.218 The proceeds after payment of counsel fees and costs incurred
in the prosecution of the suit 217 should be distributed in such manner as provided by the will of the decedent for the remainder of his estate and, in cases

of intestacy, in the manner provided by the Intestate Act.

The single action

should survive (if brought during the life of the injured person) to his personal
representative and the right of action (if none has been brought) should vest
in the latter.258 The right of action so conferred should be confined to cases
where death results from the unlawful violence or n'egligence but should include
case; of instantaneous and non-instantaneous deaths. 21
sa Settlement or judgment obtained by the injured party should not defeat the action of the personal
representative unless it affirmatively appears that damages for total loss of

earning power were released or claimed at the trial of the causo but evidence
of tkie amount so received should be admissible in mitigation of the damages
claimed by the latter.219 The statute of limitations should be two years fromthe date of injury and one year from the date of death whichever be the lesser.
Conl:ributory negligence of any beneficiary should constitute no bar to the
action.220
PHILADELPHIA
MILFORD J. MEYER
25

1 "There still remains the problem of caring for the conflicting interests of creditors and
relatives. This is primarily a matter of social policy": N. Y. Law Com. page 57. The solution
is there reached by exempting the proceeds of the death action and subjecting to the claims of
creditors the proceeds of the survival action, the two being kept distinct under the proposed'
legislation. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act both recoveries are exempt: 35 U. S..
Stat. 265,6 c. 149; 36 U. S. Stat. 291, c. 143.
t Some question may arise as to the constitutionality of such an exemption although it
would appear to have sound reason and logic in its favor.
2t7Cf.
Thompson v. Mann, (W. Va.) 64 S. E. 920.
2t8
This is provided for under the statutes of 28 of the states of the Union; see Allen. op.
cit., supra, note 5.
Institution of the suit by a representative will also cure one of the glaring defects of the
present acts pointed out by the Superior Court in Shambach v. Middlecreek E. Co., 45 Pa. Super.,
300, affirmed in 232 Pa. 641, 648. There a widow was held to be empowered to compromise
a suit under the act despite the fact that she was entitled to only one.third of the proceeds;
the children who were entitled to the balance of the fund were refused a voice in the settlement -d forced to look to their mother to collect their just due. The court specifically suggested"
legislative
remedy, which has never been provided.
8
25 aSince the'claim for personal injuries would survive under the general survival statute
and would not be converted into a death action by the death of the injured party resulting froret
causes other than the injury.
219Two considerations enter into the determination of this rule: (1) the prejudicial affect
upon the injured person of a rule which would deprive "him of the power of settling his claim
or rea.miing anything from it in his lifetime. It would naturally if not inevitably prevent such
settlements and procrastinate litigation until it could be determined whether death would ensue
from the injury." (Littlewood v. City of New York, 89 N. Y. 24, 32) and (2) the impropriety of denying a recovery after death if the damage released or claimed at the trial of the
cause was not the full damage for which recovery could be had after the death. The ruld
suggesied seems to work justice to all parties concerned.
220Cf. Harper, op. cit. supra, 612, sec. 280, and cases cited therein at notes 98, 99-see
also sec. 149.

